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Introduction and summary 
 
Ecuador is a lower-middle-income economy with about 45 percent of its export coming from 
primary and processed agricultural products. Until the 1970s agriculture was an even more 
important generator of foreign currency for the country, but the discovery of oil fields in 1967 
transformed the country’s export profile. Since 1973 oil exports have been the most important 
source of government revenue, and petroleum now accounts for about 45 percent of export 
earnings (Banco Central del Ecuador 2005). 
Historically, agriculture in Ecuador had not only a major economic role but also a 
crucial socio-cultural one. One third of the country’s population still lives in rural areas, and a 
quarter of the labor force is employed in agricultural activities (Table 1). No less than 60 
percent of Ecuador’s rural population is considered poor (Sanchez-Paramo 2005). 
Protection of agricultural producers has always been a stated goal of governments, 
with the support of the general population. Interventions have been aimed at reducing the 
variability of domestic agricultural incomes, because the sector is subject to crop diseases, 
weather fluctuations and variable international prices.  
Governments have adopted policies that affect agricultural price incentives both 
directly, and indirectly through industrial protection and macroeconomic policies. Direct 
government intervention in agriculture includes support for import-competing production 
through subsidies and border protectionist measures (tariffs and quotas on imports), as well as 
subsidization of farm credit and certain intermediate inputs to small farmers. On the export 
side, particularly when farm products were the main source of export revenues (before 1973), 
governments taxed export-oriented agricultural activities as a key source of their revenues. 
This amalgam of policies affected farmer incentives by making agricultural activities more or 
less profitable than other sectors of the economy, and it altered the competitiveness of 
different industries within the sector as well as the food prices paid by consumers. 
A key purpose of this chapter is to construct estimates of indicators of direct and 
indirect assistance to (or taxation of) the agricultural sector in Ecuador. This is done for the 
whole sector, for aggregates of export-oriented and import-competing activities, and for   2
individual commodities. Following Anderson et al. (2008), the focus is on government 
policies that cause domestic prices to diverge from what they would be under free markets. 
The conclusions about agricultural support in Ecuador should be interpreted with the 
usual caution for estimates of distortion indicators based on price comparisons. Caveats are 
necessary because assumptions and judgments are made when computing the various 
components of these measures. Moreover, the aggregate measures reported here ignore 
interventions in the services sector. Nonetheless, we believe that the measures of distortions 
to total agriculture and support and taxation of specific industries provide a reasonable basis 
for assessing the impact of agricultural and major economy-wide policies on Ecuadorian 
agriculture.  
Our analysis, based on the period from 1966 to 2003, shows that agriculture as a 
whole was subject to declining net taxation and, in recent years, has shifted to slight net 
assistance. Taxation of export-oriented crops was in constant decline and reached a level of 
minimal intervention recently, while import-competing agriculture’s heavy government 
intervention during the import-substitution period has given way to little or no protection in 
the 2000-03 period.  
Despite considerable reforms to import restrictions implemented since the late 1980s, 
there is evidence that sectoral policies still impose varying distortions to agricultural 
incentives. The greater the variability of these government policy induced distortions, the 
greater the impact on the sectoral allocation of factors of production and the higher the 
national economic welfare costs (Lloyd 1974).  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents a 
brief background of agricultural evolution prior to the 1960s. Economic growth, structural 
changes and political evolution from the 1960s to the present are then described. A narrative 
of the evolution of agricultural policies over the last 45 years follows. Methodological issues 
are then raised before summarizing and discussing the estimates of indicators of agricultural 
distortions. The final section draws implications of current policies and prospects for reform. 
 
Agricultural evolution prior to the 1960s 
 
During colonial times (1534-1822), the Spanish established an agricultural state system 
worked by native indian peons in the Sierra, the mountainous Andean area. The highlands’ 
climate and peons system was considered appropriate for crop cultivation (maize, wheat, and 
corn) and livestock farming. On the Pacific coastal plain, the Costa, there were frequent   3
outbreaks of disease, and there were fewer natives composed of mixed ethnicities, which 
made it difficult for the Spanish to coerce labor. As a result, the Costa was neglected during 
the colonial period, developing a very different culture from that of the highlands, although 
there were some export oriented agricultural activities such as sugar cane, bananas, tobacco, 
cotton and cocoa. On the eastern slopes between the Andes and the headwaters of the 
Amazon, the Oriente, fierce natives and a difficult climate prevented settlement, so only 
religious missions attempted to reach these lands (Rudolph 1991).  
After overcoming a period of regional political distress, Ecuador separated from the 
Gran Colombia in 1830 becoming a separate and independent republic.
1 The new republic 
consisted largely of a rural population, most of them under the peonage system, and its 
economy was based on cash crops and inexpensive raw materials which were vulnerable to 
international price and market demands fluctuations.  
Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, the large land tenants “terratenientes” in 
the Sierra had almost absolute control over labor and resources (Baraona 1965). The peons 
were highly dependent economically and socially on the terratenientes. Between these two 
poles there were other subordinated social groups: merchants, small land owners and local 
authorities (Panchano 1984). The Oriente experienced different social and economic 
structures, with no dominant class at a regional level.  
In the Costa at the beginning of the last century, the owners of large cocoa plantations 
were at the center of the social and political spectrum. They exercised considerable control 
over land and the economic landscape (Panchano 1984). From 1850 to 1910, cocoa exports 
were the mainstay of the economy, and to a lesser extent coffee and sugar products. The 
cocoa industry started to decline due to severe adjustments in the world market following 
World War I, and the growth of competition from Brazil and Africa, which contributed to 
over-supply. By the 1920s the cocoa industry was affected by the “Witch's Broom” fungus, 
which wiped out entire plantations, so that by the 1930s the sector was in serious decline. 
This had big repercussions for the entire economy (Luxner 1996). This transformation did not 
eliminate the privileged agro exporter class in the Costa, but it encouraged the evolution of 
medium-sized land owners.  
During the 1950s, government-sponsored replanting efforts contributed to a partial 
resurgence of the cocoa industry, and coffee and bananas started to become important export 
products with export shares between 40 and 60 percent. In the 1960s, when cocoa and coffee 
                                                 
1 The Galapagos Islands were annexed to Ecuador only in 1832.   4
started to lose their share in the international market, bananas became the most important 
export product. Since then Ecuador has been one of the world’s largest exporters of bananas.  
In the late 1950s, 90 percent of the country’s exports came from primary agriculture 
(Banco Central del Ecuador 2005). But the Law of Industrial Incentives was decreed in 1957, 
which involved adopting a development strategy based on import-substituting 
industrialization. The industrial incentives included tariff and non-tariff measures to protect 
national manufacturing production, together with low tariffs or exemptions to imports of raw 
materials and some intermediate inputs used in manufacturing. The law also created 
provisions for subsidized credit and income tax exemptions for manufacturing industries. 
 
Growth, structural changes and policy evolution since 1960 
 
The discovery of oil fields in 1967 transformed Ecuador’s agricultural-based economy, 
attracting large flows of foreign investment. On the political front, this coincided with a 
military regime (1963-66) which facilitated oil exploration-induced external indebtedness.  
Between 1965 and 1975, the share of agriculture in GDP decreased from 27 to 18 
percent, and non-agricultural activities experienced rapid development, especially the 
services sector to meet domestic demand growth (Figure 1). Industrial incentives were 
strengthened and broadened in 1962 and 1965 through the Industrial Promotion Law (which 
was modified again in 1971). However, the small size of the domestic market, a lack of a 
large pool of skilled people, and limited physical and financial infrastructure all constrained 
industrial expansion. Hence a large share of manufacturing was concentrated on what it could 
do best which was food processing. 
During the second military interlude, from 1972 to 1979, Ecuador reaped the benefits 
of high-priced oil exports. Total GDP grew at an average 8 percent per year between 1971 
and 1980, and exports earnings increased more than ten-fold (Banco Central del Ecuador 
2005). The growth in revenue allowed governments to finance subsidies related to the import-
substitution policy. At the same time it encouraged rapidly growing public and private 
expenditures. This fast economic expansion was accompanied by import growth and foreign 
debt buildup: imports increased by an average of 7 percent during the 1970s, spawning an 
inflationary pattern that eroded household purchasing power. From 1974 to 1979 the 
country’s external debt, mainly due to oil sector expansion, grew from 324 to 44,500 million 
sucres (Flores and Merrill 1991).   5
With the economic growth of Ecuador highly dependent on oil, the sharp drop in oil 
prices in the early 1980s had large consequences. The public deficit reached 7 percent of 
GDP and the country endured a period of structural adjustment after foreign banks questioned 
the country’s financial strength and resolved not to supply new loans (Whitaker and Greene 
1990). With government revenues directly linked to oil exports, the downward price trend not 
only affected government resources dramatically, but it also led to recession in the economy 
with a further decrease of the other sources of revenues (de Janvry, Sadoulet and Fargeix 
1991). The Government’s deficit was alleviated through a devaluation of the currency and 
tight control of the foreign exchange rate market. Nonetheless, the secondary market foreign 
exchange rate premium averaged 58 percent during the 1980-84 period (Table 1). 
For the period 1985-89 average GDP per capita was just over US$1,000. 
Manufacturing’s share of GDP was 17 percent, compared with an average for Latin America 
of 25 percent. The agricultural sector accounted for 15 percent of GDP but employed 35 
percent of the economically active population (Table1). Exports as a share of GDP reached 
27 percent, with oil accounting for 48 percent of the total and agricultural products 
accounting for 29 percent (Table 2).  
Three weather shocks contributed to a worsening economic crisis during the 1980s. 
The pluvial phenomenon “El Niño” in 1982-83 caused floods that severed public 
infrastructure and devastated to a great extent the Costa’s agricultural production. In 1987, an 
earthquake damaged the oil pipeline which runs from the extraction point to distribution sites, 
interrupting oil exports for 6 months. In 1988, there was a drought in the Sierra, which had 
consequences for crop production and disrupted hydroelectric power generation. 
By the late 1980s, it was perceived that the import substitution policy framework had 
not contributed to the creation of a solid and efficient manufacturing sector. The share of 
manufacturing in value added was about the same in both periods 1965-74 and 1975-84. By 
contrast, the share of the agricultural sector in GDP shrunk from one-quarter in 1965-74 to 
one-seventh in 1975-84 (Table 1).  
A turnaround in trade policy from the import-substitution framework to an export 
oriented and less-protective trade policy started in the late 1980s. The trade policy changes 
included tariff cuts and other reductions to import restrictions, elimination of export taxes 
(although some permits and licenses still apply), export promotion laws, modernization of 
trade institutions and simplification of trade procedures. Trade reform brought import tariff 
rates gradually down from an average of 51 percent in 1985 to 29 percent in 1989 and to 11 
percent in 1994 (World Bank 1988, Tamayo 1997).   6
During the 1990s, trade policy restructuring lead to consolidation with trade partners 
from the Andean Community of Nations (Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia), and to 
Ecuador’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. According to the 
GTAP database for 2001 (Dimaranan 2006), the average applied rate of protection for all 
tradeables was 8 percent.
2 In addition to trade policies, there were important economic 
reforms focused on the labor market and exchange rate, both intended to favor export-
oriented activities. The latter included exchange rate harmonization (to reduce the gap 
between the official and secondary rates), periodical mini-devaluations, and the floating of 
the currency within fixed bands. 
Ecuador experienced a very tumultuous period from 1997 to 1999 with a marked 
economic crisis in 1999 (a GDP growth rate of -7 percent) and four presidents in four years. 
This resulted from the collapse of the banking system and simultaneous currency and public 
finance problems. The crisis was triggered by a combination of exogenous and domestic 
policy-induced shocks, leading to a loss of confidence in both the banking system and the 
domestic currency. Government liabilities increased dramatically, causing the country to 
default on its recently restructured ‘Brady’ foreign debt (Jacome 2004). On the brink of 
hyperinflation, the government in 2000 adopted the U.S. dollar as legal tender as a substitute 
to the sucre. The exchange rate, in sucres per U.S. dollar, changed from an annual average of 
11,787 in 1999 to 25,000 in January 2000. The inflation rate moved from 52 percent in 1999 
to a peak of 96 percent in 2000, before falling to single digit rates in 2003 and 2004. 
The dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy was designed to increase 
macroeconomic stability by imposing tight fiscal discipline and eliminating governments 
(ab)use of exchange rate and monetary policies. Production of some non-traditional exports 
(e.g., flowers, seafood products and processed food) grew at an average rate of 10 percent per 
year for the period 2000-2005.
3 However, an evaluation of the dollarization regime is 
compromised by the simultaneous occurrence of high oil demand and prices, and importantly 
the high volume of remittances sent by migrants who left the country during the economic 
crisis. In 2005, remittances amounted to 6 percent of GDP, and they were the second source 
of U.S. dollars for the economy, behind oil but ahead of banana export revenue.
4  
                                                 
2 Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2006), using empirical trade models, estimate for Ecuador an own-country trade 
restrictiveness index of 15 percent. Restrictions faced by Ecuadorian exporters abroad averaged 18 percent. 
3 This performance is seen as the result of improved macroeconomic stability that over-compensated the initial 
real exchange rate appreciation resulting right after the implementation of dollarization (Abrego et al. 2006). 
4 In 1998, remittances amounted to 3 percent of the GDP (IMF 2006).   7
López-Cálix (2003) notes that the stability and development of the country is 
promising, but tighter fiscal controls and a reduction of the external debt service are required 
to decrease the economy’s susceptibility to external shocks in financial and oil markets. As a 
priority to improve competitiveness, he advocates for a major reform in trade policy to avoid 
the anti-export bias and to reduce the multiple and chronic distortions that still protect some 
sectors of the economy. 
 
Agricultural policies since 1960 
 
Export taxes on agriculture and import tariffs were the main sources of public revenue up to 
the mid-1960s (World Bank 1972). In the early 1960s, to anchor agricultural development, 
the government did three things: it created in 1963 the National Institute of Agricultural 
Research (INIAP) to accelerate technology adoption; it redefined some of the functions of the 
Ministry of Development by creating the Ministry of Agriculture in 1964; and it established a 
national system for agricultural credit (see Table 3 provides a chronological summary of the 
main agricultural policies in the last 45 years).  
However, the most significant agricultural policy change occurred in 1964 when the 
military dictatorship implemented the Law of Agrarian Reform and Colonization. This policy 
was a response from the military regime, as the masses started to sympathize with socialist 
reform in the region, to gain acceptance from the people and to validate its government by 
conceding to the rural poor’s demand for land ownership.
5 The stated objectives of the land 
reform were to improve the conditions of small farmers and laborers, to eliminate absentee 
ownership and precarious land tenure systems by redistributing land-ownership, the provision 
of extension services, and the incorporation of agricultural workers into the social security 
system. The military government referred to the agrarian reform as “the cornerstone on which 
to build a new, harmonious, just, and dynamic Ecuador” (Blankstein and Zuvekas 1973). 
The Ecuadorian Institute of Agrarian Reform and Settlement (Instituto Ecuatoriano de 
Reforma Agraria y Colonización, IERAC) was set up to administer the law. The size of land 
holdings was limited to 800 hectares of arable land in the Sierra, 2,500 hectares of arable land 
                                                 
5 From some accounts, the law was enacted in response to pressure from abroad to reform feudal agricultural 
practices, from humanitarian and liberal elements within the country, and from large landowners in the Costa 
who needed additional cheap labor (Flores and Merrill 1991).   8
in the Costa, and 1,000 hectares of pastureland in either region.
6 The law also set the 
minimum amount of land to be granted in the redistribution at 4.8 hectares (Flores and 
Merrill 1991).  
From the beginning the program failed to be properly funded. The mechanism of 
payment for expropriations was flawed, and most of the land reassigned was from church and 
government ownership. Of the 517,049 hectares affected between 1964 and 1969, 70 percent 
were under the modality of colonization and the rest was under redistribution of land 
(Blankstein and Zubekas 1973). The slow process of legitimization of new land owners 
meant there was still a serious obstacle to access to credit and technical assistance for many 
farmers. 
Following the departure of the military regime, revisions of the law were 
implemented in the early 1970s. The revisions required that all land with absentee landlords 
be sold to the tenants and that farm residents be permitted to acquire title to land they had 
worked for three years. Many landowners refused to rent their lands to former tenants and in 
some cases forced them off the land. 
The role of the government in conferring colonization land rights, in questioning the 
property right of inefficient systems, and in reassigning land ownership from low 
productivity systems and abandoned lands was the center of the agrarian conflict, and it 
became a big political, social and economic problem (Chiriboga 1984). 
In the Costa, land invasions were promoted by political leaders associated with leftist 
groups. Poor non-tenant farmers grouped in “cooperativas” were convinced they were 
entitled to land without having to pay for it, and their leaders were victims of harsh repression 
from landowners.
7 The land conflict claimed the lives of hundreds of people in the Coast and 
some parts of the Sierra.
8 
                                                 
6 The distribution of agricultural land in Ecuador up to 1954 was one of most unequal in Latin America. The 
First National Agricultural census in 1954 showed that 57 percent of agricultural land was concentrated in 3,704 
units (around 1 percent of the total number of farms). At the other end of the scale, 73 percent of the 
landholdings were less than 5 hectares each and comprised only 7 percent of the land area (Blankstein and 
Zubekas 1973). 
7 The groups of non-tenant rural people were known as the “precaristas”, referring to the precarious working and 
living conditions provided by large land owners. 
8 In an interview by the authors about land reform accounts in El Salitre Urbina Jado, Ivan and Carolina 
Mendoza, children of the once terrateniente Don Mendoza, said:  
“Our farm ‘Rosa de Oro’ had been in our family’s possession for generations, it was located in Urbina 
Jado, province of Guayas. It had 1,200 hectares of livestock, sugar, cocoa and rice production. We lived a 
harmonious life with workers and their families. The greed of lawyers and political leaders from Guayaquil 
permeated our workers, and their hope for land-ownership was transformed into an aggressive invasion of 
our land. The chosen name of their cooperative ‘Tierra o muerte’ (land or death) reflected their actions.   9
From 1964 to 1982 the agrarian reform affected 2 million hectares, 70 percent under 
the modality of colonization, largely in the Oriental region.
9 The impact of the agrarian 
reform on agricultural productivity cannot be properly assessed, as data on land use varies 
widely and is often considered unreliable by analysts (Flores and Merill 1991). Data for the 
mid-1980s, for example, has estimates of cropland and pastureland that vary around 20 to 50 
percent, and estimates for the total land area suitable for agriculture show a variation of 50 
percent around 27 million hectares.
10  
The government intended to complement the agrarian reform through its policy of 
agricultural growth including access to credit, subsidies to production, provision of roads 
infrastructure and guarantee minimum producer prices. However, many of the efforts were 
contradictory with taxation of export oriented activities, and numerous credit funds were 
disbursed without technical support and verification of land ownership. Owning land is not a 
sufficient condition for agricultural progress of small farmers. This is clear from the account 
of Martinez (1984): “Between 1954 and 1974 the real income for small farms (less than 5 
hectares) decreased by 16 percent with respect to the general price index and 31 percent with 
respect to food prices. The agrarian reform left the small beneficiary without access to proper 
technical knowledge, credit, irrigation, infrastructure, and technology.” 
In terms of achieving dynamism in the agricultural sector and encouraging economic 
growth, the agrarian reform produced mixed results. On the one hand, large land owners 
facing the risk of non-secure land rights were deprived the opportunity to expand their 
systems according to a pattern of development (Warman 1980). On the other hand, new lands 
were brought into production which were previously abandoned or not claimed — especially 
in the Oriental region (Chiriboga 1984). 
From the 1960s to the 1980s, the agricultural sector evolved based on the adoption 
and expansion of labor-saving technologies and the introduction of entrepreneurship. The 
policy of import substitution provided protection to crops linked to industrial processes, and 
this led to the modernization of production systems that favored large land owners — many 
                                                                                                                                                        
After facing death threats, we were forced off our land. The once-respected farm was reduced to 70 
hectares in our possession and a myriad redistribution among many people. Without proper access to 
technology, and agricultural assistance funds wasted in non-agricultural private activities, the reform was 
a catastrophe for this farm and this region — many wanting to imitate the lifestyle of ‘Don Mendoza’ saw 
the opportunity in loosely disbursed money from government’s agencies.”  
9 The amount of land legally redistributed was 1.5 million hectares (IERAC 1982). 
10 This situation is compounded by the lack of accurate information on agricultural employment. Blankstein and 
Zuvekas (1973) point out the faulty procedures of the 1968 census and the lack of comparability with the 1954 
census.   10
of whom consolidated (and even expanded) their positions, by negotiating with small tenants 
the direct sale of the newly allocated lands. Modernization was more evident in the Sierra, 
given the presence of traditional production systems directed to livestock and dairy; while the 
Costa had already evolved to some extent to more rent-oriented systems — although many 
large rice and sugar farms were affected by the precaristas (Panchano 1984). 
During the 1980s, numerous governments’ efforts were directed to provide support to 
agriculture through the creation of a marketing board, implementation of minimum producer 
floor prices, the provision of credit, direct output subsidies and subsidies to fertilizers, the 
loaning of government agricultural machinery, irrigation projects and low fees for water 
usage, the construction of rural roads and crops-storage installations, and funds for 
agricultural research and extension programs. 
Nonetheless, agriculture as a whole was negatively impacted by policy measures that 
created incentives for import-competing activities through import barriers to primary 
agriculture linked to industrial processes, over valued exchange rates, government marketing 
of agricultural products, and fixing of low consumer prices (Vos 1983, Chiriboga 1984, 
Whitaker and Greene 1990, Whitaker 1996). The focus on a more rent-oriented system led to 
an increase from 36 percent to 46 percent in the export share of agricultural production 
during this decade. 
A new law of agricultural development was implemented in the mid-1990s with the 
objective of improving access to credit and providing technical assistance and extension 
programs to rural communities. However, governments later eliminated the programs for the 
commercialization of agricultural products (ENPROVIT) and grain storage (ENAC). The 
latter action was due to the opening of Ecuador to imports and a dismantling of stockpiling of 
grains on world markets. Both programs had a positive influence on food nutrition for the 
poorest segment of the population and improved harvest prices for small farmers. 
Important trade reforms were implemented during the 1990s in Ecuador. Agricultural 
export-oriented activities benefited from the elimination of export taxes. Agricultural imports 
were facilitated by the elimination of most quotas and cuts in tariffs levels. Ecuador joined 
the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) trade partnership in 1994, adopting the Common 
External Tariff (CET) involving tariffs of 5, 10, 15 and 20 percent for all tariff lines. 
However, the classification of agriculture as a sensitive sector led to the adoption in 1995 of a 
mechanism for price stabilization known as the Andean Price Band System (SAFP).  This 
system, currently still in place, is a mechanism of variable tariffs to maintain the import price 
between a floor and a ceiling price. In theory, domestic price stabilization is achieved by   11
applying an extra import tax (variable) when the import price (reference) plus the “regular” 
tariff does not reach the floor price, or reducing the tariff down to zero when the reference 
import price is higher than the ceiling price. The SAFP sets tariffs that fluctuate between 35 
and 95 percent and it applies to 12 “marker” products, which amount to 138 related products 
and 148 tariffs sub-headings.
11 
In 1995 when Ecuador was granted membership of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), tariff ceilings were established at 10 percentage points higher than the CET except 
for automobiles, chemical products, and certain primary agriculture and lightly processed 
food products. The country successfully set its tariff schemes before 2001 and currently 
receives preferential treatment in the framework of the Global System of Preferences for 
developing countries and the U.S. General System of Preferences (GSP). Both mechanisms 
are oriented to favor industrialization and accelerated growth (Hachette 2003). In addition to 
these schemes, Ecuador receives preferential access to U.S. markets for certain products 
under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA).
12 
In 1993 the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rate on primary agricultural products 
was 8 percent, and the rate for processed food was 15 percent (authors’ calculations using the 
WITS system).
13 The bound rates in 1996, following WTO accession, were 20 percent for 
primary agriculture and 29 percent for processed food, respectively (World Trade 
Organization 2005). In 2001, the effectively applied tariff rate for primary agriculture was 8 
percent, 11 percent for processed food, 4 percent for other primary, and 8 percent in other 
manufacturing (authors’ calculations using the GTAP database). Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga 
(2006) estimate an overall rate of protection (a trade restrictiveness index) including tariffs 
and non-tariffs barriers for the period 2001-04 of 36 percent for agriculture and food and 12 
percent for non-food manufactures. 
The trade policy reforms have resulted in a greater openness of the Ecuadorian 
economy to international markets. There was  an increase in the share of total merchandise 
imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP from 37 percent in 1993 to 49 percent in 2004 
(authors’ calculations using Banco Central del Ecuador data). In particular for the agricultural 
                                                 
11 The SAFP marker products are palm oil, white rice, sugar, sugar cane, pork, barley, milk, yellow maize, white 
corn, soybeans, wheat, and chicken meat. 
12 The ATPDEA was implemented in 2002 adding product coverage to the Andean Trade Preferences Act 
(ATPA) enacted in 1991. The ATPDEA expired in December 2006. However, after two approved extensions by 
the U.S. Congress, it is set to expire in February 2008. 
13 According to the tariff information reported for the first time to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD).   12
sector, the reforms have produced noticeable structural changes. From 1980 to 2003, the 
share of crops in the total value of farm production decreased from 70 to 57 percent, and the 
share of livestock rose from 30 to 43 percent (derived from data in FAO 2004). Despite this 
orientation to protected import-competing dairy and livestock activities, the export 
performance of agriculture saw an improvement with an increase in exports’ share of the 
value of farm production from 36 percent in 1980 to 53 percent in 2003.  
The adoption of the dollar as the local currency in 2000 had an initial negative impact 
on agricultural exports, reducing the total value by one quarter from the previous year. 
However, the stability brought by the new currency system has served as a productivity 
boost. Some non-traditional exports have evolved in an important manner in the last five 
years (e.g., flowers exports reached 11 percent of non-oil exports for the 2000-04 period). By 
2003 the value of agricultural exports, in nominal terms, was at the same level as before the 
currency and debt crisis in 1999. 
 
Estimating distortions to incentives 
 
In their seminal volume, Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1991) quantitatively assess Latin 
America policy intervention in agriculture from 1960 to 1985. The study differentiates the 
direct effects due to sectoral policies (price and border protection, and subsidies) from the 
indirect effects due to economy-wide policies. Ecuador was not included in that study, but it 
was one of the 8 countries included in the World Bank’s subsequent surveillance of 
agricultural price and trade policies in Latin America, covering 1986 to 1993 for Ecuador 
(Valdes and Schaeffer 1996). There are several other studies quantifying the role of policies 
in the Ecuadorian agriculture, but they focus on a limited set of commodities and/or years 
(Vos 1983, Whitaker and Greene 1990, Whitaker 1996, Josling 1997, Quiroz and Chumacero 
1998, Banco Central del Ecuador 2003, Fernandez 2003).  
 
Defining and calculating various policy indicators 
The present project’s methodology (Anderson et al. 2008) defines indicators to study policy-
induced agricultural price distortions (as distinct from market factors, infrastructural 
investments and services that change prices and incentives more generally). The focus is on 
government-imposed distortions that create a gap between domestic prices and what they 
would be under free markets. Since it is not possible to understand the characteristics of 
agricultural development with a sectoral view alone, the project’s methodology not only   13
estimates the effects of direct agricultural policy measures (including distortions in the 
foreign exchange market), but it also generates estimates of distortions in non-agricultural 
sectors for comparative evaluation. It thereby considers the overall economic incentive 
environment. 
 
Nominal rate of assistance to agriculture, and products selected 
The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to farmers involves a direct price comparison and is 
defined as the price of a product in the domestic market less its price at the border, expressed 
as a percentage of the border price. A crucial task in constructing this measure is to make 
transport costs and margins adjustments to derive an equivalent level of comparison in the 
marketing channel (see Anderson et al. 2008). In the absence of trade flows because of 
prohibitive tariffs, an international reference price is compared with the domestic price, 
taking into account international trading costs. The same applies for preferential fob prices on 
some quota-restricted exports — a comparison of that export price with the domestic price 
would be misleading. The Appendix contains the data sources for producer and border or 
reference prices, and information on the adjustments and assumptions made. 
To account for governments’ induced distortions in the market for foreign currency, 
an equilibrium exchange rate is estimated. The parallel market exchange rate is used as an 
indicator of the marginal price paid for foreign exchange by importers. The exporters’ 
exchange rate is calculated as a weighted average of the official and the parallel market 
exchange rates with weights based on the exporter retention rate. The difference between the 
importer exchange rate and the equilibrium exchange rate is used as a measure of the 
exchange rate distortion component of protection to importables. Similarly, the difference 
between the exporter exchange rate and the equilibrium rate is used as a measure of the 
exchange rate distortion to exportable goods. 
Indicators of distortions are estimated for the agricultural sector as a whole, for 
aggregates of export-oriented and import-competing activities, and for individual 
commodities. Based on data availability, from 1990 to 2000, the NRA also includes 
assistance to primary factors and purchased farm inputs and any other non-product-specific 
subsidies net of taxes. 
This study includes the following production activities: banana, beef, cocoa, coffee, 
maize, milk, chicken meat, pig meat, rice, sugar, and soybeans. These 11 products cover 
between 60 and 84 percent of the total market value of production for the period under study   14
(1966 to 2003), as depicted in Figure 2. These commodities were subjected to heavy direct 
intervention in the form of export taxes, import quotas and tariff restrictions, and bans. 
 
Classifying the tradability of products 
The classification of products according to their trade status is straightforward for traditional 
exported products such as banana, coffee, cocoa, and sugar before 1983, and rice before 
1975. However, the classification of the remaining products according to their trade value 
data could be misleading in the presence of hindering trade barriers, or export subsidies 
designed to stabilize domestic prices. These remaining products are traded in very small 
amounts, or not traded at all, because governments have deliberately directed efforts to 
protect national industries. The approach adopted here is the “potential” net trade status in the 
absence of distortions and how domestic prices compare with international price equivalents 
— notwithstanding the absence of actual border prices. Thus, the remaining products are 
considered import-competing activities,
14 with exceptions in sugar and rice for years in which 
weather-induced over-supply resulted in a clear net exporter trading position. This 
assumption accords with the policy debate between interest groups and the government 
regarding interventions for these activities: it has focused almost exclusively on tariffs, and 
occasionally safeguards.
15 In Ecuador, with the exception of flowers and fruit exports starting 
in the late 1980s, the remaining agricultural products are considered non-traded 
internationally. 
 
Nominal rates of assistance to non-agriculture and the relative rate of assistance 
Non-agricultural industries are grouped into five aggregates: lightly processed food, highly 
processed food, non-agricultural primary resources, non-food manufacturing, and services. 
Within each of these sub-sectors, shares are defined according to their tradable status: 
importable, exportable and non-tradable. Tariff information is used to define the assistance 
estimate in non-agricultural import-competing industries, drawn from UNCTAD (WITS 
2006), the World Bank (1976 and 1988) and the IMF (2005). Export taxes, including fees and 
permits for the later periods, are used to define the (negative) assistance to exportables, drawn 
from IMF (2005) and WTO (2005). It is assumed that there are no distortions in non-
tradables. The classification and weights for aggregation are the authors’ best judgment based 
                                                 
14 However, the milk and beef sectors are marginally exporters of high-quality products. 
15 Anecdotally, in light of the presence of the avian flu virus (H9) in Colombian poultry farms Ecuador banned 
poultry imports from Colombia (reported in ‘El Universo’ newspaper 12 October 2005, Guayaquil, Ecuador).   15
on national Input-Output tables from Banco Central del Ecuador, and the GTAP 2001 
database.
16  
Anderson et al. (2008) suggest that the relevant economy-wide indicator of policy 
intervention for comparison with assistance to agriculture is not necessarily the aggregate for 
all non-agricultural activities. They suggest a comparison of the NRAs of just the tradable 
component of the agricultural sectors and the NRAs of the tradable component of non-
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where negative values indicate the policy regime has an anti-agricultural bias, and positive 
values indicate a pro-agricultural policy bias. 
 
What do the estimates of distortions reveal? 
 
This section summarizes the results for the agricultural sector and the results for the rest of 
the economy. 
 
Indicators for primary agriculture 
The nominal rates of assistance to agriculture for the period 1966 to 2003, by commodities 
and by aggregates of exportables and import-competing activities, are shown in Table 4 and 
summarized in Figure 3. Agriculture was negatively affected as an aggregate though almost 
all of that period, with agricultural policies depressing prices by as much as one-third in the 
early 1970s and averaging above zero only during the import substitution period of the early 
1980s. However, this result masks the high dispersion of policy intervention, with export 
producers facing disprotection of up to 40+ percent and import-competing farmers benefiting 
during the latter 1970s and 1980s with NRAs averaging as high as 50+ percent. The 
variability of the nominal rate of assistance, as measured by the annual commodity standard 
deviation around the value of production-weighted mean, ranges from around 100 percent up 
                                                 
16 We exclude the treatment of value added tax (VAT) in our assistance calculations, as Anderson et al. (2006) 
consider this a tax on consumption. A VAT was first implemented in Ecuador in 1990 with a 10 percent rate, 
and later raised to 12 percent in 2000. The VAT includes provisions for exclusion of primary agriculture and 
lightly processed food.    16
to the mid-1980s but dropping to less than 30 percent during the past two decades. This 
reflects the very considerable progress made since the late 1980s in trade policies reform.
17 
Exportable NRAs show a downward trend, passing from a peak net taxation around 
40 percent during the 1970s to minimal intervention in the 2000-03 period — the remaining 
intervention is mainly small fees for licenses, permits, and contributions to export promotion 
activities. Given the large weight of exportables in the production value, this sub-sector has 
dictated the aggregate NRA trend for total agriculture. The elimination of export taxes and 
the implementation of more dynamic and transparent trade procedures contributed in recent 
years to a significant reduction in distortions.  The NRA trend for import-competing products 
shows that for the period covering the land reform years, there was a small degree of 
disprotection for this sub-sector, but subsequently there was a growing degree of support to 
import-competing agriculture through the combination of exchange rate policies, border 
policies and minimum floor producer prices. One consequence of this was the expansion of 
livestock activities after the land reform, as a way of diverting efforts from labor-intensive 
activities and taking advantage of the battery of support programs intended to complement 
the land reform. 
Our calculations are consistent with the main findings of Valdes and Schaeffer 
(1996). They too find net taxation of the production of exportables and support to importables 
for the 1986-93 period.
18 Although they report an increasing degree of taxation for 
exportables, in contrast to the decreasing disprotection found in this study, the discrepancy is 
likely due to their use of reference border prices which differs from the actual fob prices used 
in this study (which are from the Banco Central del Ecuador).
19 
The divergent policy treatment of export and import-competing sub-sectors in the past 
was based on the need to generate government revenues through trade taxes in the absence of 
a consolidated tax base and institutional capacity for low-cost collection of income taxes. 
                                                 
17 Non-product-specific assistance is incorporated in the calculations of agricultural support using information 
on public expenditure in agriculture and rural areas from FAO (2006). The FAO (2006) database contains 
estimates of public expenditures on: internal and external commercialization, education, forestry support, special 
rural production support programs, agricultural managerial expenses, irrigation infrastructure, agricultural 
research and extension, land buying programs, phyto-sanitary programs, integral rural development, promotion 
of association, and regularization of land ownership. It turns out that support conferred through non-product-
specific subsidies adds less than 0.1 percent to the total agricultural NRA for the 1990s. 
18 The two studies’ NRA estimates for exportables, importables and total agriculture yield a correlation of 0.71. 
19 Moreover, Valdes and Schaeffer classify beef as exportable. We find that unconvincing, given that the bulk of 
beef production is not in border provinces. “Although the data suggests that beef is an importable, it is an 
exportable because it does not capture all the ad hoc trading between the borders. For example, large quantities 
of beef walk into the country from Peru for summer grazing, and later either walk back or are sent after 
processing. A similar situation exists with Colombia.” (Valdes and Schaeffer 1996).   17
Protectionism to import-competing production activities was always misguided as a source of 
revenues for the government. It has not been perceived by the general population as the 
implicit consumer food tax on the general population that it is.  
Moreover, the greater gap between taxation of exportables and support to import-
competing activities found in the 1980s was a direct consequence of the distortions in the 
exchange rate market. Figure 4 shows the percentage gap between exporters and importers’ 
exchange rates from 1955 to 1998 (which became zero after dollarization). We do not 
incorporate real exchange rate misalignments into measures of agricultural distortions as is 
done in Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1991). Rather, we treat distortions to exchange rates as 
equivalent to import and export taxes: distortions translate into implicit protection to import-
competing activities (Anderson et al. 2008).
20   
Figure 5 shows the evolution of agricultural policies effects at an individual 
commodity level for three periods: the first land-reform years; the period of higher protection 
conferred through the tariff and non-tariff structure and the exchange rate market; and the 
most recent period. Banana and coffee, the key sources of export revenue for the country for 
the period 1966-69, experienced a marked increase in taxation after the land reform years, in 
contrast to the minimal intervention in recent years. The government’s attempts to return the 
cocoa sector to its main-exporting commodity role are reflected in the support shown in the 
reform years. This situation changed for the 1980s period through exchange rate distortions, 
and in the most-recent period through export licenses and contributions. 
Rice is the main staple food in Ecuador, and as such its policies are particularly 
important to consumers. From 1951 to 1968, there were some specific exchange rate 
programs to support exports, amounting in nominal terms to an average NRA of 15 percent 
(IMF 2005). But the land reform process had a severe impact on many rice production zones, 
and domestic demand absorbed all production from 1968 to 1974. The annual production 
average over this period was only 10 percent greater than the 1961 figure. Since 1975, the 
country has assumed a fluctuating trade position, with the overriding goal of securing 
domestic floor producer prices. Our calculations show increasing protection of the sector 
                                                 
20 Defining and estimating exchange rate misalignment is a complex problem. There is not a definite position in 
the economics profession about the long-run behavior of the real exchange rate. In a current period, it could be 
argued that a real appreciation of the foreign exchange rate lowers uniformly the price of all tradables relative to 
the price of nontradables, and conversely for a real devaluation, and thus it does not have any effect within the 
tradables grouping of industries. Moreover, fluctuations in market perception also could lead to foreign 
exchange rate misalignment relative to what fundamentals would suggest, and again this may be quite 
independent of distortionary government policy choices. Additionally, the definition of a year base is not 
without bias when exchange rates vary a lot within each year and products are sold unevenly through the year.   18
reaching as much as 37 percent for 1995-2003, comparable to the estimate by Fernandez 
(2003) of effective protection conferred by the SAFP system of 24 percent.
21  
Sugar evolved as a competitive export product up to 1983. Afterwards, the existence 
of preferential quota access to the U.S. market and simultaneous import barriers distorted the 
evolutionary trend of the industry. Both of these mechanisms raised the price received by 
producers, acting simultaneously as a foreign-conferred export subsidy to local producers and 
support through import restrictions. Our 22 percent estimate for the period 1995-2003 
coincides with the estimate by Fernandez (2003) of effective protection of 21 percent for 
sugar producers for the same period. 
The evolution of beef and milk production was a direct result of the land reform: 
agricultural production was directed to less labor-intensive activities to reduce the risk of land 
tenure loss through occupancy pressure. Following negative protection in this period, both 
sectors capitalized on the subsequent protection conferred through the import substitution 
framework and bans on imports. Our estimates show a peak protection of almost 60 percent 
for the early 1980s, which is consistent with the finding by Chiriboga (1984) of a four-fold 
increase in minimum domestic prices from 1978 to 1983. The results for the current period 
show assistance of 32 percent for beef and 9 percent for milk.
22 
In the past, chicken meat was the most distorted sector, due to trade protective 
policies, subsidies to intermediate imports, and access to subsidized credit. Production 
benefited through domestic prices as much as three times higher than international prices. 
The opening of trade has put this sector on track to a normal process of industrial 
development, although our calculations still show some support (around 25 percent) for the 
most recent period. In Fernandez’s numbers, the SAFP provided an effective protection of 9 
percent for the period 1995-2003, and a CATO’s note by Calderon (2005) reports an effective 
protection of 78 percent in 2004. However, poultry production costs are directly affected by 
tariff-supported domestic prices of maize and soybeans, which represent up to 65 percent of 
production costs. 
Pig meat production has developed a pattern of industrialization and modernization 
with increasing protection conferred through border measures. However, like the poultry 
sector, this industry faces high production costs because of maize and soybeans supported 
prices. Our estimate of the NRA at the producer level is volatile because it requires an 
                                                 
21 Our 21 percent estimate for the period 1993-1995 is also comparable to Quiroz et al.’s (1998) of 32 percent. 
22 For the period 1993-1995, our estimate of 26 percent is comparable with the Quiroz et al.’s (1998) effective 
tariff for milk of 40 percent.    19
international reference producer price and trade costs proxies (see Appendix for details). The 
calculations for the period 2000-03 suggest a domestic price 50 percent higher than border 
prices.  
Yellow maize, a SAFP’s marker product, is supported by the fluctuating tariff 
mechanism. Because local maize production is not sufficient to supply poultry and pork 
activities, which represent 90 percent of total domestic consumption, governments have 
sponsored programs of import quotas to producers who agree to buy local production. Our 
NRA estimate for maize of 40 percent for the period covered by Fernandez (1995-2003) 
compares with their estimate of effective protection of 18 percent. According to a Ministry of 
Agriculture’s study of competitiveness (CORPEI and INCAE 2000), maize production 
exhibits low productivity and high production costs, and its profitability is due to the high 
border protection of 70 percent. 
Soybean production is supported by the SAFP’s tariff mechanism too. According to 
figures from the Ministry of Agriculture, domestic production only meets two months of 
domestic demand requirements from the poultry and feed industry. Thus, supply security is 
the policy argument to support this industry. Our estimate for the period 2000-03 shows 
protection of 12 percent. 
 
Indicators for non-agriculture, and the RRA to agriculture 
The details of the estimates of the nominal rate of assistance (NRA) in non-
agricultural industries are presented in Appendix Table 5. The production weighted average 
for total non-agriculture shows a minimal intervention for the period under study, with a 
current protection estimate of 3 percent. Import-competing industries have consistently 
enjoyed protection, reaching a peak of 33 percent in the early 1980s, and the current average 
estimate for the latest years is 14 percent. Exportables have experienced taxation in the past, 
while current estimates show almost no intervention.  
The sectoral view is useful to identify differences in the policy treatment of these 
industries.
23 Other primary sectors (mainly oil and gas production) have had minimal 
distortions in the past, and our measures do not capture any distortion since 1995. Non-food 
manufacturing has experienced a decreasing trend in protection, with an estimate around 5 
percent in the most recent period. Based on our calculations, food production activities 
(lightly and processed) are the most distorted sectors. Protection has focused on these sectors 
                                                 
23 In the absence of reliable estimates we assume zero NRA for services.   20
to enhance production stability and food supply insurance to consumers. Highly processed 
food industries show minimal intervention, with an average for the latest years of 4 percent. 
Lightly processed food production has experienced a trend from taxation to protection in 
recent years, with a peak of 20 percent (conferred through tariffs). 
Once distortions to non-agricultural industries are considered, the relative rate of 
assistance to agriculture (RRA) shows that there was a decreasing trend in the taxation of 
agricultural tradables from a peak RRA level of -30 percent in the 1970-74 period, to a level 
of minimal intervention in the 2000-03 period. Importantly, during the early 1980s, the RRA 
shows an offsetting of policies (Table 5 and Figure 6). 
 
Conclusions and prospects for Ecuadorian agricultural policy 
 
Ecuadorian agriculture experienced a profound transformation as a result of policy 
intervention during the past 45 years. The agricultural land ownership reforms of the late 
1960s and 1970s affected patterns of production and resulted in marked structural changes. 
Price controls and myriad subsidies to production altered the sector during the 1980s. To a 
greater degree, however, trade policies and interventions in the foreign exchange markets 
during the 1980s and 1990s created incentives to transfer resources to import-competing 
sectors and imposed a burden on export industries. Government protection was largely 
influenced by the lobbying of interest groups. Arguments advanced for agricultural 
protectionism included the importance of securing production activities as employment 
generators and the need to secure domestic food supplies. However, export-oriented agro-
industries were successful at competing internationally in spite of policy-induced distortions 
to their incentives. From a rural income perspective, export-oriented agriculture has the best 
prospect for offering sustainable and stable employment. 
The policy environment of the last decade brought dynamic changes to the sector, 
significantly decreasing the anti-agricultural policy bias. Since the adoption of dollarization 
in 2000, the direct effect on agriculture from interventions in the foreign exchange market has 
been eliminated. However, the intra-sectoral bias is still present despite substantial reforms to 
trade policy, as border measures confer an important degree of protection to import-
competing activities. The trade policy reforms included the abolition of export subsidies and 
export taxes (some contribution and permit fees still apply), and a considerable reduction in 
tariffs and quota implementations.   21
Economic welfare of the country (including producers and consumers) could still be 
enhanced by the elimination of remaining agricultural protectionist measures. The greatest 
role for agriculture in achieving poverty reduction may be through growth of internationally 
competitive activities, which generate rural employment and increase rural income. For 
instance, cocoa, banana, shrimps and more recently flowers have become lead export 
industries. 
The near-term trade policy challenge for Ecuador is not to lose preferential market 
access to the U.S., in light of the expiration of benefits granted under the ATPDEA, which 
have been extended until February 2008. It seems unlikely that further preferential market 
access extensions could be granted in absence of a free trade agreement between Ecuador and 
U.S.  The current suspension of the negotiations may put the country in a disadvantaged 
position with risks of trade diversion. Especially considering that Colombia and Peru, the 
country’s most important trade partners in the Andean Community of Nations partnership, 
have already concluded their negotiations with U.S.
24  Prospects for further trade reform and 
integration arise in two other areas: negotiations of the Andean Community with the 
European Union; and indications of the government’s desire to initiate negotiations with 
MERCOSUR. 
                                                 
24 The CAN (Andean Community of Nations), at the time of this research has been completed is 
enduring heavy scrutiny, as Venezuela decided to withdraw from it as a consequence of the trade 
agreement of Colombia and Peru with the U.S.   22
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Table 1: Basic economic indicators, Ecuador, 1965 to 2004 
 
  1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Population  
(in million)  5.5 6.3 7.3 8.4 9.6  10.7  11.8  12.7 
          
Labor force 
(in million)  1.8 2.0 2.4 2.7 3.3 3.9 4.5 5.0 
          
Agricultural 
workers  
(% of labor force) 
54   49   43   38   35   32   28   25  
          
Agricultural land 
(in million Ha)  4.7 5.0 5.8 6.9 7.6 8.0 8.0 8.1 
          
GDP per capita 
(in current USD)  268 371 946  1466  1043  1255  1786  1875 




26 21 16 13 15 16 15  8 




17   7   7   58   32   14   4    
 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2006).   27
Table 2: Exports total value and product value composition, Ecuador, 1965 – 2004 
 
  1965-69  1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
(percent) 
Oil  1 27  57 69 48 42 31 45 
Bananas   43 31  10  7 13 20 22 17 
Coffee and products  22  15 13 7  10 5 3 1 
Cocoa and products  16 9  3 5 6 3 2 2 
Flowers, abaca and wood  0 0  0 0 0 0 4 6 
Shrimp  1  2  2  5 14 15 16  5 
Tuna and other fish  1 1  1 0 1 2 2 2 
Other  
(incl. manufactures)  17 15  14  8  8 12 20 22 
Total  100 100  100 100 100 100 100 100 
(current U.S. dollars) 
TOTAL (in million)  155  474  1425 2426 2313 3117 4634 5723 
 
Source:  Based on Banco Central del Ecuador data and Acosta (2006)   28
Table 3: Overview of major agricultural policy developments in Ecuador since 1957 
Date Measure  Description 
1957 and 
1962 
Law of Industrial Incentives 
Import Substitution Policy 
• Implementation of tariff and non-tariff barriers to protect manufacturing 
• Low tariffs or exemption to intermediate input imports 
• Subsidized credit and income tax exemption to manufacturing industries 
1963  Creation of INIAP  • National Institute of agriculture research, main mechanism for 
technology adoption.  
1964  Creation of Ministry of 
Agriculture (before functions of 
Ministerio de Fomento) 
• To delineate the agricultural development, through technology transfers, 
services, and prices determination 
1964 
 
Reform Agrarian Law 
“La Ley de tierras baldías y 
colonización” 
Redistributing land-ownership with the objectives of: 
• Eliminating precarious land tenure systems 
• Improving the conditions of the small farmer and agricultural workers 
• Providing agricultural extension services 
•  Incorporating agricultural workers into the social security system 
1964  Establishment of a national 
system for agricultural credit. 
Banco Nacional de Fomento 
• Main mechanism of credit to the agricultural sector 
1966  Creation of INERHI. National 
system of irrigation 
• Development and assignment of irrigation areas 
1970   Law of Abolition of precarious 
systems  
• To eliminate precarious rental agreements and to make all farmers 
landowners 
1973  Second Law of Agrarian reform  • To promote agriculture efficiency by redistributing land ownership of 
low productivity systems  
• .Ownership reassignment of government and church lands 
• To provide credit and technical assistance 
• Implementation of subsidies and establishment of minimum prices 
1979  Law of Agricultural Development. 
Law of Colonization of the 
Amazon region 
• To provide support to agriculture through: subsidies to production, 
technical assistance, access to credits, and minimum floor prices 
• To control further land invasions through hard repression measures 
1980-90 Implementation  of  Land 
purchases programs 
The most notable program was Protierras 
• Negotiated external debt funds were destined to loans for land purchases
1986 Marketing  Board  • To promote efficient agricultural trading 
1992 and 
1994 
Exports Facilitation and Aquatic 
Transport 
• To impulse and diversify the country’s exports 
• To eliminate legal processes which restrict exports 
1990 Implementation  of  VAT  • 10% tax on value added, with exceptions on agriculture 
1992  Abolishion of export taxes  •  To promote agricultural exports 
1993 Implementation  of  agricultural 
import tariffs band mechanism 
• To reduce agricultural price volatility and provide an stable production 
environment 
1994  New Law of Agricultural 
Development 
• To improve access to credit for production 
• To provide technical assistance and extension programs  
1995 WTO  accession   
1997  Creation of CORPEI 
(Corporation for the Promotion of 
Exports and Investments) 
• To promote the country’s exports offer and attract foreign investment by 
offering technical assistance to exporters, promoting trade promotion 
events, facilitating the establishment of trade companies alliances, and 
operating a network of commercial offices 
1997  Creation of COMEXI (Council of 
External Trade and Investments) 
• To delineate external trade policies and direct investment 
• To define strategies for trade negotiations and economic integration 
• To delineate CORPEI’s strategic plan for export promotion 
1999  Debt, exchange, banking crisis  • Default of external debt 
2000 Dollarization  • Adoption of U.S. dollar as legal tender 
2000  Changes in VAT  • 12% tax on value added, with exemptions on agriculture 
2003 Drawback  Law  • To reimburse taxes paid on production inputs of exportable goods 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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Table 4: Nominal rates of assistance to covered agricultural products, Ecuador, 1966 to 2003 
(percent) 
   1966-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03 
   
Exportables   -20.6 -40.0 -43.2 -31.1 -26.1 -11.1 -10.4 -2.9 
Banana -34.6 -48.5 -52.4 -39.1 -37.4 -8.6 -16.4 -7.3 
Cocoa 5.6 -16.2 -13.3 -4.0 -13.5 -16.4 -11.7 -6.7 
Coffee -19.0 -41.8 -61.9 -39.4 -28.6 -15.6 -21.6 0.1 
            
Import-competing products   -1.9 -14.5 26.4 53.8 26.7 -1.0 7.8 22.2 
Maize 28.2 39.8 69.9 62.5 39.4 18.6 30.3 49.9 
Soybean 50.7 -7.8 29.9 11.9 4.5 -1.8 -7.3 12.2 
Milk -14.2 -28.3 22.7 58.1 24.0 9.8 6.6 8.7 
Beef -11.7 -29.2 74.9 62.0 41.3 -6.2 5.3 31.8 
Chicken meat  284.8 228.8 254.0 315.4 105.7 20.0 28.5 24.6 
Pigmeat 6.4 -13.7 -9.1 33.2 4.9 -20.0 -10.9 50.5 
   
Mixed trade status 
a   
Rice  -6.5 -8.0 -1.7 24.7 25.7 -6.2 35.2 39.8 
Sugar -9.6 -47.1 21.4 -15.3 -0.9 -15.2 28.5 13.0 
             
Total of covered products 
b -14.8 -31.5 -20.8 9.9 -0.8 -6.4 -2.0 12.2 
Dispersion of covered products 
c 99.0 88.6 104.8 106.2 48.5 18.8 27.9 29.6 
% coverage (at undistorted prices)  64.8 71.2 71.9 62.4 73.2 82.5 82.1 82.6 
 
a Mixed trade status products included in exportable or import-competing groups depending upon their trade status in the particular year.  
b Weighted average using value of output at unassisted farm-gate prices as weights.  
c The the simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean. 
Source: Authors' calculations (see Appendix).   30




   1966-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03 
Covered products   -14.8 -31.5 -20.8 9.9 -0.8 -6.4 -2.0 12.2 
Non-covered   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -1.7 -3.4 
All agric. products
a -9.6 -22.4 -15.0 5.9 -1.0 -5.3 -2.0 10.2 
Trade bias index 
b  -0.19 -0.28 -0.54 -0.55 -0.38 -0.09 -0.15 -0.20 
   
Assistance to just tradables   
   All agricultural tradables
a   -14.8 -31.5 -20.8 9.9 -0.8 -6.4 -2.6 11.2 
   All non-agricultural tradables  1.2 -3.2 4.8 9.4 8.6 2.5 5.8 8.5 
Relative rate of Assistance, RRA
c -15.8 -29.3 -24.5 0.3 -8.8 -8.8 -8.1 2.2 
   
 
a  The inclusion of non-product-specific subsidies from 1990 to 2000 adds less than 0.1 percent to the NRA for total agriculture.  
 
b Trade Bias Index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the 
import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 
 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
Source: Authors' calculations (see Appendix).   31
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Figure 2:  Agricultural production value shares, measured at market prices, by farm product, 














































Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, importable and all covered agricultural 































































































Source: Authors' calculations (see Appendix). 
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Figure 4: Proportion by which the exchange rate (LC per U.S. dollar) for importers exceeds 
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Source: Authors' calculations (see Appendix).   35




Source: Authors' calculations (see Appendix).   36
Figure 6: Nominal rates of assistance to all non-agricultural tradables, all agricultural tradable 
industries, and relative rates of assistance
































































































t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
Source: Authors' calculations (see Appendix). 
   37






Production: Almeida and Almeida (1950-1983), FAO (1984-89), SICA (1990-2004). 
Import: Banco Central del Ecuador Boletín Anuario.  




Production: Almeida and Almeida (1950-1983), FAO (1984-89), SICA (1990-2004). 
Import: Banco Central del Ecuador Boletín Anuario. 




Production: (Almeida and Almeida (1950-1983), FAO (1984-90), MAG (1991-2005). 
Import: FAO (1961-2001), CORPEI (2002-04). 






Conversion factor: Colombian average conversion factor for the period 1960-2005 
(Guterman, 2006). 
Import: FAO (1961-2001), COMTRADE (2002-04). 
Export: COMTRADE (1961-2003). 
 
Rice, unmilled 
Production: FAO (1961-89), SICA (1990-2004). 
Import: FAO (1961-89), SICA (1990-2004). 
Export: FAO (1961-89), SICA (1990-2004). 
 
Rice, white 
Conversion factor: MAG estimates for 2001.  
Import: FAO (1961-89), Banco Central del Ecuador (1990-2004). 
Export: FAO (1961-89), Banco Central del Ecuador (1990-2004). 
 
Maize 
Production: Authors’ estimates using production indexes (1966-68, 1985-89), Almeida and 
Almeida (Maíz duro) (1969-84), SICA (1990-2004). 
Import: COMTRADE (1969-94), Banco Central del Ecuador (1995-2004). 
Export: COMTRADE (1971-96),  Banco Central del Ecuador (1997-2004). 
 
Soy 
Production: FAO (1961-68, and 1985-89), Almeida and Almeida (1969-84), SICA (1990-
2004).   38
Import: COMTRADE (1990-2004). 
Export: COMTRADE (1990-2004). 
 
Milk 
Production: FAO (1961-2004). 
 
Beef 
Production: FAO (1961-2004). 
Import: FAO (1961-98), Banco Central del Ecuador (1999-2003), COMTRADE (2004). 
Export: FAO (1961-98), COMTRADE (1999-2001). 
 
Chicken meat 
Production: FAO (1961-2004). 
Import: FAO (1961-91), COMTRADE (1992-2003). 
Export: FAO, (1961-2001); COMTRADE (2002-03). 
 
Pig meat 
Production: FAO (1961-2004). 
Import: FAO (1961-90), COMTRADE (1991-2005). 
Export: FAO (1961-2001), COMTRADE (1992, 1993, 1998, 2000-02) 
 
 
PRICE DATA  
 
Banana: 
Producer price: FAO (1966-89), SICA (1990-99), MAG (2000-04). 
Domestic price (exporter’s price before customs): Authors’ calculations. Producer price is 
adjusted by using an ad valorem margin of 65% until 1981, and a specific margin of 80 USD 
afterwards. Based on CORPEI data for selected years and Rosero’s (2001) estimate for 1997 
of 61% increment on the producer price.  
Border price: fob price, Almeida and Almeida (1950-81), FAO (1982-84), Banco Central del 
Ecuador Boletín Anuario (1985-2004). 
 
Cocoa: 
Producer price: FAO (1966-89), SICA (1990-99), MAG (2000-04). 
Domestic price (exporter’s price before customs): Authors’ calculations. Producer price is 
adjusted by using an ad valorem margin of 14%. Based on farm and producer price data from 
SICA for selected years. 




Producer price: FAO (1966-99), MAG (2000-04), version FAOSTAT (sept06). FAO series 
for 1989-1999 has been adjusted by a factor of 10. 
Domestic price (exporter’s price before customs): Authors’ calculations. Producer price is 
adjusted by using an ad valorem margin of 22 %.  Data inferred from production and 
transportation costs of Arabica and Robusta varieties (see pp. 17 and 23, Banco Central del 
Ecuador Apuntes de Economia No. 40). 
Border price: Green New York/Hamburg Central America fob Reference Price, adjusted for 
estimated transportation costs (0.06 USD/lb).   39
 
Sugar, cane: 
Producer price: FAO 
 
Sugar, raw: 
Domestic price: Authors’ calculations based on producer price and processing costs. Border 
price: Unit export value from FAO (1966-82). From 1983 onwards, given the existence of a 
preferential exporters’ price in some markets, a reference price is selected following the 
methodology of Anderson et al. (2008). For this latter period, a reference border price is 
computed by adding to the Colombia’s fob price (as documented in Guterman, 2006) the 
average gap between Ecuadorian and Colombian fob prices for 1961-72.  
Appendix figure 1 shows sugar fob prices in Brazil, Colombia, the Ecuadorian fob price 
(preferential US quota recipient in latter years), and the calculated border price. 
 
Rice, unmilled: 
Producer price: FAO (1966-90), SICA (1990-99), MAG (2000-04). 
Domestic (milling buy) price: Authors’ calculations. Producer price is adjusted for 
transportation by using an ad valorem margin of 5%. 
Border price: Use of a reference price. Given the existence of preferential export prices, 
import tariffs and quota restrictions, a reference border (international) price is selected 
following the methodology of Anderson et al. (2008). In consideration to the actual trading 
position without policy intervention, unmilled rice is classified as an exportable until 1974 
and as an importable afterwards. We make exceptions for years where weather-induced over 
supply define a clear net exporter trading position. 
Authors’ estimates of a reference price are based on the Colombian cif price, and calculated 
transport margins.  
Using authors’ estimates of transportation costs, the Ecuadorian fob price is calculated by 
reducing the Colombian cif price by 30%, and the Ecuadorian cif price is computed by 
increasing the Colombian cif price by 12%. (Colombian prices from Guterman, 2006).   
Authors’ estimate of transportation costs are based on grains freight rate US-Ecuador data 
from SICA (30% for the 1990-2000 period, 39% in 2004, 22% in 2005). Using data from 
COMTRADE, an 18% average grains freight rate US-Colombia is calculated for the period 
1990-2005.  
Appendix figure 2 shows the Colombian cif, the international reference Thailand, and the 
calculated border prices. 
 
Rice, white: 
Domestic price: Based on production prices and authors’ calculations of milling and 
transportation margins. Based on own estimates using wholesale data from SICA and Vieria 
and Nieto (2003)’s estimates for 2002. 
Border price: Use of a reference price. Given the existence of preferential export prices, 
import tariffs and quota restrictions, a reference border (international) price is selected 
following the methodology of Anderson et al. (2008). In consideration to the actual trading 
position without policy intervention, rice is classified as an exportable until 1974 and as an 
importable afterwards. We make exceptions for years where weather-induced over supply 
define a clear net exporter trading position. 
Authors’ estimates of a reference price are based on the Colombian cif price, and calculated 
transport margins (as in the determination of unmilled rice border price).  
Appendix figure 3 shows the cif price in Colombia and Brazil, and the calculated border 
prices.   40
 
Maize: 
Producer price: FAO (1970-90), SICA (1990-2004). Previous years are computed by 
backward extrapolation using price indexes. 
Domestic (wholesale) price: SICA (1990-04). Previous years are estimated using the 
calculated average ad valorem margin between wholesale and producer price for the period 
1990-2004. 
Border price: Reference price, US fob price (source: IMF 2006) adjusted by 30% 
transportation costs. Transportation costs calculations based on the cif/fob average ratio for 
the period 1990-2000 using trade data from SICA and COMTRADE. 
 
Soy: 
Producer price: FAO (1966-89), MAG (1990-2004). 
Domestic (wholesale) price: MAG (1990-02). Previous years are estimated using the 
calculated average ad valorem margin between wholesale and farm price for the period 1990-
2002. 
Border price: Reference price, US fob price (source: IMF 2006) adjusted by 30% 
transportation costs. Transportation costs calculations based on COMTRADE data. 
 
Milk: 
Producer price: Milk, whole, Producer price from FAO (1966-97), MAG national average 
(1998-2005). 
Border price: Use of a reference price. Milk whole, New Zealand’s producer price, source: 
FAO and IMF average exchange rates.  
This study follows the OECD’s framework for milk Producer Support Estimates (PSE) by 
using a price comparison between the domestic and the New Zealand producer price after 
cost adjustments. Authors’ assumptions are: 1) transportation costs to processing or final 
point of consumption are equal in both countries, 2) the calculated ratio cif/fob (equal to 
1.25) of actual trade of powder milk from New Zealand to Ecuador is used as a proxy for 




Producer price: FAO dressed carcass weight (excl. fats) producer price. 
Border price: Use of a reference price, Australia. FAO dressed carcass weight (excl. fats) 
producer price.  
Authors’ assumptions are: 1) transportation costs to processing/final point of consumption are 
equal in both countries, 2) Australia’s price is adjusted by applying the authors' calculated 
average ratio cif/fob (equal to 1.251) of Ecuadorian imports from Australia for the period 
1999-2003 (source: COMTRADE and SICA). 
 
Chicken meat: 
Producer price: FAO chicken-ready-to-cook producer price. 
Border price: Use of a reference price, US. FAO chicken-ready-to-cook producer price. 
Authors’ assumptions are: 1) transportation costs to processing/final point of consumption are 
equal in both countries, 2) US’s price is adjusted by applying the authors' calculated average 
ratio cif/fob (equal to 1.125) of Ecuadorian imports from US for the period 1999-2003 
(source: COMTRADE and SICA). 
 
Pig meat:   41
Wholesale price: FAO dressed carcass producer price. 
Cif price: Use of a reference price, US. FAO dressed carcass producer price. 
Authors’ assumptions are: 1) transportation costs to processing/final point of consumption are 
equal in both countries, 2) US’s price is adjusted by applying the authors' calculated average 
ratio cif/fob (equal to 1.125). 
 
 
TRADE TAXES AND SUBSIDIES  
 
Export subsidies: Cocoa, Coffee and Sugar, from IMF (2005 and earlier years). 






Official exchange rates are annual averages from IMF (2006 and earlier years). 
Secondary exchange rates are from IMF (2005 and earlier years) for 1955 to 1980. 
Parallel exchange rates are calculated from 1981 to 1993 using the International Currency 
Analysis (1993 and earlier years) as reproduced as premia in Easterly (2006).   42
List of data sources 
 
Almeida Guzmán P. and R. Almeida Arroba (1988), Estadísticas Económicas Históricas 
1948-1983, Fuentes para la Historia Económica del Ecuador. Serie Estadísticas 
Históricas vol. 1, Ediciones del Banco Central del Ecuador, Quito. 
Anderson, K., W. Martin, D. Sandri and E. Valenzuela (2006), “Methodology for Measuring 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives.” Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 02, 
World Bank, Washington DC, August. Available at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions 
Banco Central del Ecuador (2003), “Hechos Estilizados de 31 Sectores Productivos en 
Ecuador.” Agenda de Competitividad y Agenda de Inserción de la Economía a los 
Mercados Mundiales, April. 
Banco Central del Ecuador (2003), “Análisis Sectorial del café.” Apunte de Economía No. 
40, Dirección General de Estudios, Noviembre. 
Banco Central del Ecuador (2004), “El Banano en Ecuador. Estructura de mercados y 
formación de precios.” Apunte de Economía No. 42, Dirección General de Estudios, 
Enero.  
Banco Central del Ecuador, Boletín Anuario (2005 and earlier years). Quito Ecuador. 
COMTRADE (2006), The United Nation Statistical Division Commodity Trade Data Base, 
data compiled through the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). World Bank, and 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Available at 
wits.worldbank.org, accessed September. 
CORPEI (2006), Corporación de Promoción de Exportaciones e Inversión, Sistema de 
Inteligencia de Mercados Database. Available at www.corpei.org, accessed October-
November. 
Easterly, W. (2006), Global Development Network Growth Database. Available at 
www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/global%20development%20network%20growth%20dat
abase.htm, accessed June. 
FAOSTAT (2006), Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics Databases. Available at: 
//faostat.fao.org, accessed October. 
Guterman, L. (2006), “Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Colombia.” Agricultural 
Distortions Working Paper, World Bank, Washington DC, December. Available at 
www.worldbank.org/agdistortions 
International Currency Analysis (1993 and earlier years), World Currency Yearbook 
(formerly Pick’s Currency Yearbook). Brooklyn NY: International Currency 
Analysis, Inc. 
IMF (2005 and earlier years), Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions: Annual 
Report. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund (available back to 1950). 
IMF (2006 and earlier years), International Financial Statistics. Washington DC: 
International Monetary Fund (annual). 
MAG Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería del Ecuador (2006), Proyecto SICA-
BIRF/MAG-Ecuador.  http://www.mag.gov.ec/. 
Rosero J. (2001), “Un análisis sobre la competitividad del banano ecuatoriano.” Apunte de 
Economía, No. 17, Dirección General de Estudios, Banco Central del Ecuador, July.  
Sandri, D., E. Valenzuela, and K. Anderson (2006), “Compendium of Global Economic and 
Trade Indicators, 1960 to 2004.” Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 01, World 
Bank, Washington DC, July. Posted at www.worldbank.org/agdistortions. 
SICA (2006), Servicio de Información Agropecuaria del Ministerio de Agricultura y 
Ganadería del Ecuador. Available at www.sica.gov.ec, accessed July-October. 
Viera J. and M. Nieto (2003), “Las fallas en la formación de los precios.” Revista GESTIÓN 
No. 109 Julio, Quito, Ecuador.   43
Appendix Table 1: Prices and NRAs for primary products, Ecuador, 1966 to 2003 
(Trading status following the methodology of Anderson et al. (2008): X = exportable, M = importable,  
HX = non-tradable primary, exportable derived lightly product) 
 
Banana (X)  Cocoa (X)  Coffee (X) 



























1966 752 59  -0.31  12312  535  0.25  11305  762  -0.20 
1967 762 59  -0.35  12484  557  0.13  11463  698  -0.17 
1968 741 58  -0.35  12134  579  0.07  11141  681  -0.16 
1969 756  57 -0.38  12371  748 -0.23  11359  691 -0.23 
1970 873  67 -0.38 9463  608 -0.26  12759  960 -0.37 
1971 896  75 -0.56  11153  499 -0.18  12200  796 -0.43 
1972 896  76 -0.56  11400  506 -0.15  13261  913 -0.45 
1973 1076 78  -0.48  22403  794  0.07  20236  1176  -0.35 
1974 1148  83 -0.45  26567 1480 -0.29  15912 1225 -0.48 
1975 1254 105  -0.54  29798  1098  0.05 16067  1215  -0.49 
1976 1370 110  -0.54  41040  1462  0.04 21960  2907  -0.72 
1977 1485  113 -0.52  52212 3224 -0.41  28060 4914 -0.79 
1978 1601  123 -0.50  63373 3078 -0.21  39931 3342 -0.54 
1979 1683  134 -0.52  64535 2841 -0.14  41358 3535 -0.56 
1980 1782  152 -0.56  58710 2235 -0.01  64195 3143 -0.23 
1981 1782  172 -0.62  37118 1591 -0.15  39330 2535 -0.43 
1982 4433  169 -0.20  46694 1437 -0.01  41480 2759 -0.54 
1983 6326 168  -0.35  122105  1733  0.21 80230  2579  -0.47 
1984 9456  148 -0.22  166246 2671 -0.24 163596 2846 -0.30 
1985 11168  173 -0.40  184395 1965 -0.12 166269 2862 -0.46 
1986 16246  201 -0.46  226267 1856 -0.07 360888 3947 -0.29 
1987 23310  190 -0.42  344907 1825 -0.10 383894 2164 -0.01 
1988 36788  193 -0.51  448670 1469 -0.21 477020 2682 -0.54 
1989 112877  211 -0.09  577125 1190 -0.18  1037366 2028 -0.13 
1990 179115  213 -0.07  790180 1090 -0.20  1519266 1605  0.05 
1991 290445  264 -0.11  1080766 1066 -0.18  1478152 1541 -0.22 
1992 393739  247 -0.15  1275683 1016 -0.33  1576826 1117 -0.25 
1993 419197  216 -0.03  1856923 1005 -0.08  2610898 1288  0.01 
1994 473035  226 -0.07  2570050 1183 -0.04  4346030 3052 -0.37 
1995 567790  225 -0.11  3031841 1288 -0.17  10218720 3165  0.14 
1996 741330  248 -0.07  3762946 1280 -0.09  7524960 2487 -0.06 
1997 945332  291 -0.22  5635111 1400 -0.03  10043040 4014 -0.40 
1998 1211036  268 -0.24  7916536 1537 -0.13  9945440 2810 -0.40 
1999 2250944  235 -0.19  9811980 1005 -0.17  16728640 2216 -0.36 
2000 130  200 -0.35  733  764 -0.04  1298 1847 -0.30 
2001 226  232 -0.03  879  991 -0.11  1314 1161  0.13 
2002 240 223  0.08  1561  1608  -0.03  1148  1017  0.13 
2003 233 231  0.01  1590  1739  -0.09  1080  1039  0.04 
 
Source: Authors' calculations using methodology from Anderson et al. (2008) and data sources 
reported in text.   44
Appendix Table 1: Prices and NRAs for primary products, Ecuador, 1966 to 2003 (cont.) 
(Trading status following the methodology of Anderson et al. (2008): X = exportable, M = importable,  
H = non-tradable primary) 
Sugar, cane (H)  Rice, unmilled 
 
  Domestic 
price 


















1966 73   0.01  1264  72  105  X  -0.05 
1967 74   -0.05  1350  92  134  X  -0.26 
1968 72   -0.07  1706  86  126  X  0.01 
1969 73   -0.28  1754  79  115  X  0.04 
1970 59    -0.45 1559 64 93  X  0.16 
1971 87    -0.38 1695 59 86  X  0.06 
1972 109    -0.34 1901 66 97  X  0.08 
1973 65    -0.57  2208 121 177  X  -0.31 
1974 152    -0.61  3310 212 309  X  -0.38 
1975 176    -0.63  4109 148 215  M  -0.26 
1976 200    -0.28  4557 108 157  M  0.07 
1977 225   0.19  5009 115 167  M  0.10 
1978 247   0.59  5460 151 220  M  -0.04 
1979 352   1.20  5576 139 203  M  0.04 
1980 358    -0.31  5912 170 248  M  -0.10 
1981 202    -0.29  7130 188 273  M  -0.05 
1982 391   0.40  8001 122 177  M  0.38 
1983 388    -0.27 14501 117 170  M  0.46 
1984 466    -0.30 20223 109 159  M  0.55 
1985 993   0.70  28581  95  138  M  0.94 
1986 1400   0.30  35721  90  131  M  0.81 
1987 1167   -0.42  24927  99  144  M  -0.18 
1988 2581    -0.28 55955 130 189  M  -0.23 
1989 4640    -0.35  108119 134 195  M  -0.06 
1990 7890    -0.32  134043 122 178  M  -0.16 
1991 11220    -0.15  164735 131 190  M  -0.30 
1992 14870    -0.35  275352 122 177  M  -0.17 
1993 16600    -0.15  307787 109 158  M  -0.03 
1994 28000   0.21  380594 125 182  X  0.35 
1995 35000   0.00  518879 140 204  X  0.31 
1996 51000   0.42  640500 145 211  X  0.37 
1997 59000   0.33  951038 133 193  X  0.73 
1998 89000   0.41  1203122 132 193  X  0.54 
1999 114000   0.28  1502729 108 157  M  -0.19 
2000 18   0.22  168  90  131  M  0.28 
2001 15   -0.15  147  76  111  X  0.92 
2002 20   0.38  137  83  121  M  0.12 
2003 14   0.07  157  85  124  M  0.27 
 
Source: Authors' calculations using methodology from Anderson et al. (2008) and data sources 
reported in text.  45
Appendix Table 1: Prices and NRAs for primary products, Ecuador, 1966 to 2003 (cont.) 
(Trading status following the methodology of Anderson et al. (2008): X = exportable, M = importable,  
HX = non-tradable primary, exportable derived lightly product) 
Maize (M)  Soy (M) 


















1966  1769  75 0.26  3957  151 0.42 
1967  1769  70 0.26  4012  134 0.51 
1968  1726  62 0.42  3900  126 0.58 
1969  1726  68 0.19  3976  123 0.52 
1970  1360 76  -0.15 3522  140  0.20 
1971  3139 76  0.53 2302  150  -0.43 
1972  3515  72 0.83  4588  167 0.03 
1973  4671 127  0.39  5217 346  -0.43 
1974  6003  172 0.39 10341  330 0.25 
1975  6111  155 0.52  9578  261 0.41 
1976  6215  146 0.57 10252  281 0.34 
1977  6319  124 0.87 10622  340 0.15 
1978  6423  131 0.89 11004  315 0.35 
1979  6493  150 0.64 11217  344 0.24 
1980  7070  163 0.63 11577  345 0.27 
1981  6966  170 0.50 11419  340 0.23 
1982  7463  141 0.62 11599  288 0.23 
1983  19686  177 0.91 22625  337 0.15 
1984  21291 177  0.47 19908 335  -0.28 
1985  24168  146 0.55 32731  264 0.16 
1986  23914  114 0.39 51752  246 0.40 
1987  35536  98 0.72 61914  254 0.16 
1988  68160 139  0.27 85235 364  -0.39 
1989  88343 145  0.04  169954 321  -0.10 
1990  137589  142 0.07  275575  285 0.07 
1991  189331  140 0.10  339464  271 0.01 
1992  278551 135  0.09  485938 273  -0.05 
1993  340677 133  0.28  569514 299  -0.05 
1994  435827 140  0.38  622800 298  -0.07 
1995  561379 160  0.23  807435 291  -0.02 
1996  727518 214  0.05  976461 361  -0.16 
1997  815702 152  0.29  1499128 365  -0.01 
1998  1180586 132  0.51  1511981 290  -0.12 
1999  1965547 117  0.42  2531388 227  -0.06 
2000  170 115  0.48  223 238  -0.06 
2001  180  116 0.55  296  219 0.35 
2002  201  129 0.56  310  245 0.26 
2003  193 137  0.41  284 303  -0.06 
 
Source: Authors' calculations using methodology from Anderson et al. (2008) and data sources 
reported in text.  46
Appendix Table 1: Prices and NRAs for primary products, Ecuador, 1966 to 2003 (cont.) 
(Trading status following the methodology of Anderson et al. (2008): X = exportable, M = importable,  
HX = non-tradable primary, exportable derived lightly product) 
Milk (M)  Beef (M) 


















1966 1513 106  -0.22  7100 387  0.00 
1967 1534  103 -0.25  7200  418 -0.13 
1968 1491  80 -0.04  7000  412 -0.13 
1969 1521  75 -0.05  7140  419 -0.20 
1970 1900 77  0.17 7165  436  -0.22 
1971 1800  90 -0.26  9334  435 -0.21 
1972 1800  128 -0.47  9272  458 -0.24 
1973 2030  143 -0.46  11602  631 -0.31 
1974 2420  158 -0.39  9435  733 -0.49 
1975 3662  140 0.01 14280  282 0.96 
1976 4000  125 0.19 16000  297 0.99 
1977 4330  131 0.21 18500  347 0.96 
1978 4670  162 0.11 19783  381 1.01 
1979 5110 120  0.61 23076  1049  -0.16 
1980 5760 129  0.68 24240  1080  -0.15 
1981 7230  147 0.80 42880  992 0.58 
1982 8380  157 0.63 55310  749 1.25 
1983 12200  150 0.39 80610  755 0.83 
1984 15210  132 0.41  113200  865 0.59 
1985 19800  120 0.54  157000  746 0.97 
1986 25720  132 0.29  190050  717 0.76 
1987 32690  131 0.19  216420  762 0.35 
1988 90940 168  0.40  307660 929  -0.14 
1989 95610 209  -0.22  655290 989  0.13 
1990 141600  208 -0.25 751730 1025 -0.19 
1991 205590 142  0.17  2364460  2143  -0.11 
1992 329390  182 -0.04  2915040 1950 -0.21 
1993 497300  200 0.24  4323980  1752 0.23 
1994 608650 200  0.35  4635700  2151  -0.04 
1995 760830 226  0.19  5675860  2049  -0.02 
1996 831950 278  -0.07  6190340  1792  0.07 
1997 1038370  245 0.02  7023160  1613 0.05 
1998 1449000  186 0.32  12168900  1523 0.35 
1999 1969020  192 -0.13  15894300 1655 -0.19 
2000 170 177  -0.04  1700  1681  0.01 
2001 250  216 0.16  2696  1808 0.49 
2002 270  252 0.07  3360  2203 0.53 
2003 250  216 0.16  2842  2286 0.24 
 
Source: Authors' calculations using methodology from Anderson et al. (2008) and data sources 
reported in text.   47
Appendix Table 1: Prices and NRAs for primary products, Ecuador, 1966 to 2003 (cont.) 
(Trading status following the methodology of Anderson et al. (2008): X = exportable, M = importable,  
HX = non-tradable primary, exportable derived lightly product) 
Chicken meat (M)  Pig meat (M) 


















1966  27190  379 2.89 10670  566 0.02 
1967  27570  330 3.22 10820  474 0.15 
1968  26800  352 2.89 10510  459 0.17 
1969  27320 377  2.40 10720 550  -0.09 
1970  20562 338  1.89 11031 563  -0.07 
1971  31250  340 2.39 14000  434 0.19 
1972  34032 350  2.66 13910 622  -0.16 
1973  40972 595  1.60 17400 953  -0.31 
1974  52083 533  2.89 14150 848  -0.34 
1975  54580 653  2.23 21420  1143  -0.28 
1976  57100 583  2.62 23420  1089  -0.21 
1977  59670 581  2.77 25330 983  -0.05 
1978  59670  646 2.57 30475  1155 0.02 
1979  59670  645 2.51 29292  1046 0.06 
1980  58100  684 2.20 29680  950 0.18 
1981  103760  702 4.40 43690  1087 0.47 
1982  119000  665 4.46 58290  1268 0.40 
1983  143370  704 2.49 81970  1091 0.29 
1984  220550  834 2.22  127530  1171 0.32 
1985  254000  747 2.18  170000  1096 0.45 
1986  255670  853 0.99  186000  1232 0.00 
1987  320730 694  1.20  218600  1281  -0.19 
1988  501540 821  0.58  331860  1050  -0.18 
1989  711680  908 0.33  719460  1054 0.16 
1990  916890 809  0.26  936050  1332  -0.22 
1991  1715140 1070  0.30  1766130 1947 -0.27 
1992  2203250 1104  0.06  2172800 1671 -0.31 
1993  2719440 1181  0.15  3210290 1812 -0.11 
1994  3381150 1215  0.24  3275870 1599 -0.09 
1995  4752680 1169  0.43  3691190 1415 -0.08 
1996  5892000 1295  0.41  4047880 1814 -0.31 
1997  7337610 1281  0.38  5051790 1848 -0.34 
1998  9762820  1335 0.24  8064240  1202 0.14 
1999  14225990 1260 -0.04  13055100 1059  0.05 
2000  1250  1142 0.09  1653  1477 0.12 
2001  1724  1335 0.29  2157  1548 0.39 
2002  1970  1036 0.90  2253  1167 0.93 
2003  1884 2708 -0.30  2047 1299  0.58 
 
Source: Authors' calculations using methodology from Anderson et al. (2008) and data sources 
reported in text.   48
Appendix Table 2: Prices and NRAs for lightly processed foods, Ecuador, 1966 to 2003 
(Trading status following the methodology of Anderson et al. (2008): X = exportable, M = importable) 
 






















1966  2077  112 0.01  2981 152 221  X  0.07 
1967  2105  112 -0.05 3184 194 283  X  -0.17 
1968  2048  112 -0.07 4023 182 265  X  0.13 
1969  2077  135 -0.28 4134 167 244  X  0.16 
1970  1679  145 -0.45 3676 135 197  X  0.29 
1971  2475  148 -0.38 3996 126 183  X  0.17 
1972  3101  178 -0.34 4481 141 205  X  0.20 
1973  1849  163 -0.57 5206 255 372  X  -0.23 
1974  4325  436 -0.61 7803 446 650  X  -0.30 
1975  5007  527 -0.63 9687 311 453  M  -0.17 
1976  5690  291 -0.28  10745 228 332  M  0.19 
1977  6401  198 0.19  11809 243 354  M  0.23 
1978  7027  170 0.59  12874 318 463  M  0.07 
1979  10015  172 1.20  13146 295 429  M  0.16 
1980  10185  555 -0.31  13938 360 524  M  0.00 
1981  5747  294 -0.29  16810 396 577  M  0.06 
1982  11124  243 0.40  18865 260 379  M  0.52 
1983  11039  258 -0.27* 34189 251 365  M  0.61 
1984  13258  231 -0.30* 47682 235 342  M  0.70 
1985  28252  156 0.70  67389 206 299  M  1.11 
1986  39831  203 0.30*  84223 195 284  M  0.97 
1987  33202  271 -0.42* 58773 214 311  M  -0.10 
1988  73431  265 -0.28  131930 277 404  M  -0.15 
1989  132011  345 -0.35  254923 287 417  M  0.04 
1990  224476  364 -0.32  354521 262 381  M  0.03 
1991  319217  304 -0.15  439462 280 407  M  -0.13 
1992  423062  348 -0.35  558361 261 380  M  -0.22 
1993  472281  277 -0.15  686829 232 338  M  0.02 
1994  796619  293 0.21  964960 265 386  X  0.62 
1995  995774  352 0.00*  1330334 297 433  X  0.58 
1996  1450985  317 0.42  1393798 307 447  X  0.41 
1997  1678591  305 0.33*  2179057 280 408  X  0.88 
1998  2532112  305 0.41*  3022846 280 408  X  0.83 
1999  3243379  215 0.28*  3712842 228 332  M  -0.05 
2000  249  203 0.22  360 191 279  M  0.29 
2001  223  263 -0.15  325 163 237  X  1.00 
2002  267  194 0.38  313 177 258  M  0.22 
2003  214  199 0.07  360 180 263  M  0.37 
* Defined as importable, as indicated by the high volume of imports. 
 
Source: Authors' calculations using methodology from Anderson et al. (2008) and data sources 
reported in text.  49
Appendix Table 3: Exchange rate, Ecuador, 1955 to 2004 











1960 15.15  15.6,  16.9  17.60  16.99 
1961 16.33  15.7,  17.4  21.70  20.36 
1962 18.00  20  22.20  21.15 
1963 18.18    22.40  21.35 
1964 18.18    18.60  18.50 
1965 18.18    18.52  18.44 
1966 18.18    18.52  18.44 
1967 18.18    20.39  19.84 
1968 18.18    20.02  19.56 
1969 18.18    22.40  21.35 
1970 20.64    21.21  21.07 
1971 25.00    27.80  27.10 
1972 25.25    27.00  26.56 
1973 25.00    26.96  26.47 
1974 25.00    25.15  25.11 
1975 25.00    26.20  25.90 
1976 25.00    27.80  27.10 
1977 25.00    28.00  27.25 
1978 25.00    26.20  25.90 
1979 25.00    26.80  26.35 
1980 25.00    27.03  26.52 
1981 25.00    28.17  27.38 
1982 30.03    33.70  32.78 
1983 44.12    63.06  58.32 
1984 62.54    88.75  82.20 
1985 69.56    119.28  106.85 
1986 122.78    160.00  150.69 
1987 170.46    223.19  210.00 
1988 301.61    414.93  386.60 
1989 526.35    608.83  588.21 
1990 767.75    947.33  902.44 
1991 1046.25    1297.00  1234.31 
1992 1533.96    2000.00  1883.49 
1993 1919.11    2026.09  1999.34 
1994 2196.73    2270.00  2251.68 
1995 2564.49    2925.00  2834.87 
1996 3189.47    3242.34  3229.12 
1997 3998.27    4189.58  4141.75 
1998 5446.57    6051.75  5900.45 
1999 11786.80    11786.80  11786.80 
2000 1.00    n.a.  1.00 
2001 1.00    n.a.  1.00 
2002 1.00    n.a.  1.00 
2003 1.00    n.a.  1.00 
2004 1.00      n.a.  1.00 
a See Anderson et al. (2008) on the exchange rate methodology used in this study    50
Appendix Table 4: Nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to agriculture, Ecuador, 1966 to 2003 
(percent) 
  NRAs covered products    NRAs Total Agriculture 
  Import 




  Import 






1966 -5 -14 -12  0    -5  -14  -7.3  n.a. 
1967 -8 -21 -16  0    -8  -21  -10.5  n.a. 
1968 6 -19 -11  0    6  -19  -7.2  n.a. 
1969 -1 -28 -20  0    -1  -28  -13.4  n.a. 
1970 7 -34 -22  0    7  -34  -15.1  n.a. 
1971 -6 -44 -32  0    -6  -44  -23.4  n.a. 
1972 -25 -41 -35  0   -25  -41  -24.7  n.a. 
1973 -27 -35 -32  0   -27  -35  -22.6  n.a. 
1974 -21 -46 -37  0   -21  -46  -26.4  n.a. 
1975 8 -47 -26  0    8  -47  -18.5  n.a. 
1976 28 -49 -24  0    28  -49  -16.8  n.a. 
1977 36 -56 -32  0    36  -56  -23.9  n.a. 
1978 31 -33 -12  0    31  -33  -8.9  n.a. 
1979 29 -32 -10  0    29  -32  -7.1  n.a. 
1980 30 -28 -7  0    30  -28  -4.8  n.a. 
1981 61 -46 4  0    61  -46  2.2  n.a. 
1982 80 -26 25  0    80  -26  14.8  n.a. 
1983 50 -29 17  0    50  -29  9.8  n.a. 
1984 47 -27 11  0    47  -27  7.2  n.a. 
1985 75 -27 15  0    75  -27  9.8  n.a. 
1986 45 -28 6  0    45  -28  4.6  n.a. 
1987 11 -17 0  0    11  -17  0.2  n.a. 
1988 7 -45 -16  0    7  -45  -12.3  n.a. 
1989 -5 -14 -9  0    -5  -14  -7.4  n.a. 
1990 -16 -8 -12  0    -16  -8  -9.6  -9.5 
1991 -5 -14 -9  0    -5  -14  -7.9  -7.8 
1992 -12 -20 -16  0   -12  -20  -13.8  -13.7 
1993 13 -4 5  0   13  -3  4.4  4.4 
1994 15 -10 0  0    15  -10  -0.1  -0.1 
1995 11 1 6 0    11  1  4.6  4.7 
1996 0 0 0 0   0  0  -0.2 -0.1 
1997 7 -16 -7  -2    7  -15  -6.1  -6.1 
1998 30 -15 7  -3    30  -14  4.5  4.5 
1999 -9 -21 -15  -3    -9  -18  -13.0  -13.0 
2000 7 -24 -4  -4    7  -19  -3.8  -1.0 
2001 32 4 19 -3    32  2  15.2 n.a, 
2002 41 9 28 -3    41  5  21.9 n.a. 
2003 10 0 6 -3    10 -1  4.6 n.a. 
Source: Authors' calculations using methodology from Anderson et al. (2008) and data 
sources reported in appendix.   51
Appendix Table 5: Value shares
a of primary production of covered
b and non-covered 
products, Ecuador, 1966 to 2003 
(percent) 
  Banana  Beef Cocoa  Coffee  Maize Milk  Pigmeat Poultry Rice  Soybean  Sugar 
Non-
covered
1966  18 4 5  10 1 12 3 0 4 0 7  36
1967  19 4 5 9 1 13 3 0 4 0 6  36
1968  20 4 6 8 1 11 3 1 3 0 8  36
1969  22 5 7 7 1 11 3 1 4 0 7  33
1970  23 5 7 9 1 11 3 1 3 0 6  31
1971  27 5 6 8 2 14 3 1 2 0 7  26
1972  21 4 7 8 1 16 3 1 2 0 6  30
1973  18 5 8 7 3 16 5 1 4 0 5  29
1974  14 5 8 8 3 13 3 1 6 0  11  29
1975  16 2 7 7 3 11 4 1 7 0  14  28
1976  15 2 8  19 2 9 4 1 5 0 5  30
1977  12 2  16  24 1 8 3 1 4 0 4  25
1978  12 2  18  15 1 10 4 1 3 1 3  29
1979  11 6  14  18 2 8 4 1 4 1 3  28
1980  13 5  12  11 2 7 4 1 6 1 8  32
1981  13 5 4  11 2 9 4 1 7 1 4  40
1982  10 4 4  13 2 11 5 1 4 1 3  42
1983 6 5 5  14 2 12 5 2 4 0 4  41
1984 5 5  12  15 3 11 5 2 4 1 3  33
1985 5 4  15  18 2 10 5 2 3 1 2  33
1986 8 4 8  21 2 11 5 3 5 1 3  29
1987 9 5 7  12 2 13 6 3 8 2 4  29
1988 5 6 7  20 2 15 4 3 11 3 3  23
1989  17 5 5  12 2 17 4 3 9 2 4  21
1990  21 6 5  10 2 17 5 3 7 2 4  19
1991  27  11 4 8 2 10 7 4 7 2 3  16
1992  27  10 4 6 2 14 6 4 8 2 4  15
1993  25 9 3 6 2 14 6 4 8 2 3  18
1994  23 9 3  15 1 12 4 4 6 1 2  19
1995  24  10 3  13 2 14 4 4 6 1 3  16
1996  26 8 3  11 2 15 5 5 5 1 2  17
1997  35 7 3 7 2 12 5 6 4 0 1  18
1998  28 9 2 4 0 14 5 5 5 0 3  23
1999  32  10 3 5 1 14 4 7 7 0 2  16
2000  18  12 3 5 2 15 7 10 7 1 3  17
2001  29  11 2 2 2 17 6 8 3 1 3  16
2002  25  13 4 1 1 18 5 6 4 1 2  20
2003  23  13 4 1 1 14 5 15 4 1 2  18
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
 
a Each row sums to 100.  
 
b At farmgate undistorted prices, US$.   52
Appendix Table 6: Nominal rate of assistance in non-agricultural tradable industries, 
Ecuador, 1966 to 2003. 
(percent) 
      1966-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94  1995-99  2000-03
             
Lightly processed food production 
  Importable  -3  -19 27 55 28  2  8 20 
  Exportable -8  -26  -5  -23  -17  -8  -9  21 
  Nontradable  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
  Weighted  average  -6  -23 12 32 20  0  6 20 
             
Highly processed food production 
  Importable  18 16 12 15 30 20  20 18 
  Exportable  -3 -1 -2 -5 -7 -4  -1  0 
  Nontradable  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
  Weighted average  2 2 2 1 3 2  3 4 
              
Non-ag primary production 
  Importable  18 16 12 15 30 17  13 11 
  Exportable  -3 -1 -2 -5 -7 -4  -1  0 
  Nontradable  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
  Weighted average  -1  0 -1 -2 -3 -1  0  0 
              
Non-food manufactures 
  Importable  18 16 12 15 30 17  12 10 
  Exportable  -3 -1 -2 -5 -7 -4  -1  0 
  Nontradable  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
  Weighted average  9 8 6 7  14 8  6 5 
              
Total NRA (weighted average of above sectors) to Non-Agriculture 
  Importable  11  3 18 33 29 10  11 14 
  Exportable  -4 -7 -3 -7 -8 -4  -2  1 
  Tradables    1  -3 5 9 9 2  6 9 
  Nontradable  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
   TOTAL non-Agric  0  -1 1 2 2 1  2 3 
 
* Value added used as weights when available otherwise value of production. 
 
Source: Authors' calculations   53
Appendix Table 7: Nominal rates of assistance to covered, uncovered and all agricultural 
products, to exportable and import-competing agricultural industries, and relative to non-

























1966 -12  0  -7 -14 -5 -12 2 -13
1967 -16  0 -10 -21 -8 -16 1 -18
1968 -11  0  -7 -19 6 -11 2 -13
1969 -20  0 -13 -28 -1 -20 -1 -19
1970 -22  0 -15 -34 7 -22 1 -22
1971 -32  0 -23 -44 -6 -32 -2 -30
1972 -35  0 -25 -41 -25 -35 -4 -32
1973 -32  0 -23 -35 -27 -32 -5 -28
1974 -37  0 -26 -46 -21 -37 -6 -33
1975 -26  0 -18 -47 8 -26 -1 -25
1976 -24  0 -17 -49 28 -24 3 -26
1977 -32  0 -24 -56 36 -32 6 -36
1978 -12  0  -9 -33 31 -12 7 -18
1979 -10  0  -7 -32 29 -10 9 -17
1980 -7  0 -5 -28 30 -7 2 -9
1981 4 0 2 -46 61 4 11  -6
1982  25 0  15 -26 80 25 16 8
1983  17 0  10 -29 51 17 8 8
1984  11 0 7 -27 47 11 9 2
1985  15 0  10 -27 76 15 15 0
1986 6 0 5 -28 45 6 12  -5
1987 0 0 0 -17 11 0 6  -6
1988 -16  0 -12 -45 7 -16 6 -21
1989 -9  0 -7 -14 -5 -9 3  -12
1990 -12  0 -10 -8 -16 -12 -1 -11
1991 -9  0 -8 -14 -5 -9 3  -12
1992 -16  0 -14 -20 -12 -16 -1 -15
1993 5 0 4 -3 13 5 4 1
1994 0 0 0 -10 15 0 7  -7
1995 6 0 5 1 11 6 7  -1
1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 5  -5
1997 -7 -2 -6 -15 7 -8 5  -12
1998  7 -3  4 -14 30 4 9 -4
1999 -15  -3 -13 -18 -9 -15 3 -18
2000 -4 -4 -1 -19 7 -3 5 -8
2001 19 -3 15 2 32 17 10  7
2002 28 -3 22 5 41 26 13 12
2003  6 -3  5 -1 10 5 7 -1
a NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product-specific assistance.
 
b NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-covered products.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet   54

















Reconstructed Ecuador fob 
 
Source: Authors' calculations 
 
 
Appendix Figure 2: Unmilled rice cif and fob prices (U.S. $/tonne), Ecuador and other 















Source: Authors' calculations   55
Appendix Figure A3: Polished (white) rice cif and fob prices (U.S. $/tonne), Ecuador and 
















Source: Authors' calculations 